COUNTER-PIRACY AND MARITIME CAPACITY BUILDING: FALLACIES OF A DEBATE

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With the decline of the numbers of piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia, attention has shifted to capacity building. This is an important move in the right direction. The lack of capacity to police and govern the sea off East Africa was one of the reasons why piracy could spread and escalate to the degree it reached in 2011. Now is the right time to shift the focus from the containment of piracy through international naval patrols to the long-term prevention of piracy in the region. The maritime security infrastructure in Eastern Africa and the Western Indian Ocean littorals remains weak. Much has to be done.

The main global governance body dealing with Eastern African piracy, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS), aims at coordinating maritime capacity building since its inauguration in 2009. The CGPCS conducted a needs assessment mission in 2009 and capacity building was on the agenda of its Working Group 1. Capacity building is carried out by a growing range of actors, including several bilateral programs and projects realized by different international organizations, centrally UNODC, IMO and the EU, but also private non-governmental or commercial actors. The target of these projects is Somalia and its sub-regions, as well as the wider East African and Western Indian Ocean region. Initially capacity building was concerned about improving law enforcement capacity and raising legal standards, that is police, prisons and court capacities. The focus has become increasingly wider. Projects now aim at improving general coast guard and naval force functions, maritime surveillance or the management of fisheries.

The considerable extension of capacity building efforts led to a growing awareness for the need of better coordinating the different projects and activities. For this purpose the CGPCS decided in 2012 to form a subgroup to coordinate capacity building. The Capacity Building Coordination Group (CBCG) intends to facilitate coordination between different capacity building activities and to better match the needs of countries with the provided (or intended) projects. Following their regular meetings the CBCG also agrees on “observations” concerning the state of capacity building. To facilitate coordination the CBCG has developed a database: the Capacity Building Coordination Platform (CBCP). The platform is maintained by the US based NGO Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP). Its core goal is to enhance transparency and match offered projects with
the needs expressed by countries. The database documents well the breadth of current capacity building projects. By November 2013 it listed 147 different projects financed or implemented by 17 different governments or international organizations. In 2013 the CGPCS initiated a reform process to respond to the changing situation. In this process it was consensual from the onset, that capacity building remains one of the main challenges. In the new working group structure of the CGPCS, concluded in May 2014, a new working group devotes its attention exclusively to capacity building. Both the CBCG and the CBCP remain in place and now run under the supervision of the new working group. Technically the new working group has not met, but during the May 2014 CGPCS meeting terms of reference for the group were agreed and the first official meeting is scheduled for the end of October 2014.

If the CGPCS was an overall success story, notably in clarifying the legal framework for counter-piracy, coordinating naval activities, prosecutions and criminal investigations, its record of success in the area of capacity building appears so far mixed, if not even disappointing. Despite all good statements and political will, capacity gaps are not adequately addressed, there is overlap, priorities are unclear and counter-piracy actors and recipient governments frequently mourn about the quality of coordination. What is going wrong here? What would be necessary to improve coordination and capacity building? What contributions can the new working group make and how might it become a success story similar to the other CGPCS working groups?

In this paper I firstly raise awareness for the different nature of capacity building compared to other counter-piracy activities. Secondly, I point to three fallacies of the current debate and point towards solutions. These solutions can be condensed from the lessons of the areas in which the CGPCS has been successful, notably military coordination and the harmonization of legal standards. I discuss three fallacies, first, misunderstandings with regards to what expertise capacity building requires, secondly, misperceptions of the hindrances of coordination, thirdly, a lack of attention to the problems that the principle of ownership creates.

MARITIME CAPACITY BUILDING: WHAT IS DIFFERENT?

To understand why the coordination of maritime capacity building is facing difficulties, it is first important to acknowledge the differences to other areas of counter-piracy. One of the reasons why the overall coordination by the CGPCS was successful was that the Group managed to focus clearly on one issue – Somali piracy. It hence could work within a focussed and clearly defined agenda. Maritime capacity building makes it very difficult to uphold and police this narrow focus. In capacity building, piracy can hardly be separated from the broader maritime insecurity challenges. It would be difficult to imagine a

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coast guard that would deal exclusively with piracy, and doesn’t focus on other maritime threats. As is increasingly becoming obvious different forms of maritime insecurities are, moreover, linked to each other – a gang might be smuggling on one day and form a pirate action group on another. These links also hold true for the relation between security at land and security at sea. State fragility is directly linked with maritime insecurity. With the focus on maritime capacity building the CGPCS is hence venturing into new fields: a clear border between the issue of piracy and the broader security and development challenges in Somalia and the wider region is difficult to draw. In consequence, it becomes much more challenging to depoliticize the issue. Bilateral relations, the strategic interests of states in the region, and the priorities of national development policies play a much stronger role. In maritime capacity also other actors enter the stage, many of which have not been involved in counter-piracy before. This might be actors such as the Food and Agricultural Organization attempting to implement fishery regulations, port developing companies, private security actors providing training and capabilities, or development and humanitarian agencies implementing projects that want to tackle the root causes of maritime insecurity. This further increases the multiplicity of actors involved and hence makes coordination more difficult than before.

DEFINING MARITIME CAPACITY BUILDING

Another problem arises because of the confusion around the notion of “maritime capacity building”. Various broad and narrow understandings circulate. For advocates of a narrow understanding capacity building only concerns the training of security forces and the police. Those drawing on a broad understanding include various aspects of ocean governance, the blue economy or the resilience of coastal populations. The argument of the advocates of a broad understanding is that capacity building is useless if it does not address the broader causes of piracy and the interlinked maritime insecurities. A further source of contestation is whether capacity building should include more than the transfer of knowledge and skills (software), and should also entail the delivery of equipment and tools, ranging from training facilities to naval and patrol vessels (hardware). Moreover, actors involved in capacity building work within very different temporalities. Naval missions, for instance, primarily conduct very short term and ad hoc training as part of their port visits. They focus on the transfer of skills largely through demonstration. Capacity building projects, such as the IMO led Djibouti Code of Conduct process (DCoC), the UNODC’s Counter Piracy Program, or the EU’s capacity building mission EUCAP Nestor work in a short to mid-term timeline of six months to two years. Here the focus is on the delivery of

some equipment and the provision of intensive (usually one week) training courses for selected specialists. Long term perspectives which focus on the setting up of training infrastructure, education – such as professional courses or executive masters – are an important dimension to make capacity building sustainable. They have so far rarely been part of the programmes. Overall a short to mid-term logic dominates that focusses on projects with deliverables and measurable outcomes. This ‘projectization’ is to some degree paradoxical, since much of the impact of capacity building will be on a less tangible level.

For the purpose of the following discussion maritime capacity building is defined as,

activities which are directed at the empowerment of governments and coastal communities to efficiently and efficacously govern and sustainably exploit the maritime domain, including territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.

This definition centred on empowerment stresses the importance of the transfer of knowledge, skills and technology and the establishment of routines, procedures and institutions which improve governance and exploitation. It is a broad definition that emphasizes that maritime security implies working governance structures and has an intrinsic link to the blue economy. It hence includes measures directed at illicit activities and maritime crime, such as piracy, or the trafficking of people, weapons, or other illicit goods as well as the regulation of the blue economy, including fisheries, tourism or natural resources. Such a broad definition is favourable for at least two reasons. It firstly emphasizes what the long term goal of capacity-building is. Secondly, it ensures political buy-in from regional countries and alignment to other strategies. African states have already framed maritime security in similar terms, as expressed, for instance, in the African Union’s 2014 African Integrated Maritime Strategy.

Awareness for how capacity building is different in contrast to other areas of counter-piracy, and reflecting on the definition and strategic objectives of maritime capacity building is the first step to improve coordination. The current debate however suffers from a range of fallacies which are discussed in more detail below.

CAPACITY BUILDING IS A FIELD OF EXPERTISE IN ITS OWN RIGHT

The first fallacy of the current debate is that maritime capacity building tends not to be seen as a field of expertise and knowledge in its own right. Capacity building has become a major strategy in development policy and peacebuilding activities. In the counter-piracy debate, there

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3 The DCoC is a partial exception since one of the core elements is the building of a regional training centre.
is a lack of apprehension of the rich body of knowledge, international agreed principles and experience available from decades of capacity building, peacebuilding, security sector reform or post-conflict reconstruction. Capacity building in the maritime domain is indeed a relatively novel issue – which reflects the more general problem of sea-blindness and a decade old lack of attention for the maritime domain. This, however, does not imply that the rich experience in capacity building under difficult circumstances, in peacebuilding, and in institution-building in fragile states has not importance insights for maritime capacity building. Exactly the opposite! If maritime capacity building does not want to repeat mistakes from the past, than the knowledge of what works and what does not from these more general debates on capacity building has to be taken into account. However, the link between maritime capacity building on the one hand, and capacity building and assistance towards fragile states on the other hand, is often not adequately made.

One main reason is a cognitive disconnect between the land and the sea. The majority of those engaged in maritime capacity building are specialized in the maritime. For naval officers, for instance, capacity building is a novel task. While they have specialized knowledge in maritime operations and tasks, they are hardly experienced in how to deliver capacity building and work under conditions of fragility. On the other side of the coin, those who are specialized in development and peacebuilding have a great deal of knowledge about capacity building in general terms, but lack any specific knowledge about the demands of the maritime domain. The debate first of all requires that these connections are made and that experience sharing between maritime and peacebuilding specialists is facilitated.

Recognizing the broad knowledge basis and expertise the design of maritime security capacity building can draw on is then firstly important for avoiding mistakes of the past and drawing on the lessons of past failures. Drawing on such expertise and integrating it in the work of the Capacity Building Working Group can however also strengthen the core task of the group, that is, coordination. Academic literature has shown how important expertise is in coordinating international policy. This becomes obvious if we peer to the lessons of the CGPCS working groups on legal questions. In the legal working group independent experts could provide the basis of international consensus by providing common terms and references, in outlining what challenges exist and in suggesting possible answers. This led to the drafting of the Legal Tool Kit – one of the greatest successes of the CGPCS to achieve international harmonization – as well as a range of expert based recommendations of how to tackle legal challenges. The legal working group succeeded in integrating the political knowledge of diplomatic generalists,
the technical knowledge of specialists in law enforcement, and the knowledge of independent legal experts.

It is likely that the new capacity building working group can benefit from such an approach as well. Indeed, developing a Capacity Building Best Practice Toolkit, following the role model of the Legal Tool Kit, would be a productive approach to pursue. Such a Best Practice Tool Kit would

- offer definitions of core terms, such as Maritime Security, Maritime Capacity Building, Maritime Security Sector Reform or Ownership, on the basis of existing policy papers, or, for the case that no agreed upon definition is possible, provide maps of the different understandings and conflicting viewpoints to better structure the debate;

- outline in a systematic fashion the different approaches to maritime capacity building actors draw on, what advantages and disadvantages these have, and in which political contexts certain approaches are more promising than others. This includes, for instance, approaches such as short term training courses, briefings, demonstrations, or embedded advisors;

- compile the lessons from capacity building in other areas then the maritime, such as Security Sector Reform in Sub Sahara Africa;

- and finally, detail which international agreements speak to problems of maritime capacity building and should be considered in the CGPCS.

A Capacity Building Best Practice Tool Kit would draw on and complement the CBCP database by general guidelines, a mapping of controversies and in contextualizing the different capacity building projects. Such a Best Practice Tool Kit would aid in de-politicizing the capacity building debate and fill core gaps in the work of the CGPCS. It will strengthen mutual learning and the sharing of experience. It will be useful beyond the immediate situation in Somalia and Eastern Africa, and can also help facilitating coordination in other areas of high maritime insecurity. If drafted mainly by African experts, this tool kit would be moreover an implicit form of capacity building and thus a way of empowering and increasing the ownership of regional countries.

**IS ‘COORDINATION’ MORE THAN A BUZZWORD?**

The core aim of the new capacity building working group is to improve coordination. Coordination is one of the buzzword of today’s international policy.8 Hardly any political dialogue, international conference or strategy paper that deals with international assistance does not come to the same conclusion: that more coordination is needed. Coordination in itself does not provide the solution to any problem. Calling for more coordination often clouds the

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true challenges, namely what should be
coodinated and how it can be coordinated.

Analyses of coordination have pointed out
that one can envision three different modes
of coordination: hierarchy, market, and
network. In the hierarchical mode an over-
arching plan is developed, everyone given
a role and function with clear task descrip-
tions and compliance is monitored. In the
market mode suppliers compete over ful-
filling the needs of consumers. Markets
require an agreed currency, transparent
price standards, the rational decisions of
consumers, as well as the equal access of
suppliers to the market. In the third
mode of network, coordination takes place by
communication. Actors coordinate via
nodal points in which they share infor-
mation and align their behaviour in an ad-
hoc manner. Both the hierarchical model
(given the absence of authoritative powers)
as well as the market model (given the ab-
sence of a transparent market and a cur-
rency) seem ill-suited to understand what
the CGPCS does and intends to do.

To understand how a network model
works well, we can rely on the lessons
from the successful military coordination
in counter-piracy. Military coordination is
organized in different layers which offer
distinct nodal points. The Shared Aware-
ness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Mecha-
nism and its subgroups on capacity build-
ning and intelligence provide regular (quar-
terly) meeting formats in which primarily
military operational staff – but also ship-
ning associations – meet to discuss short
term operations and tactics. The linked
electronic Mercury platform provides a
chatroom style tool for information sharing
in real time and hence supports everyday
coordination. The CGPCS’ former Work-
ing Group 1 provided a bi-annual meeting
format in which larger strategic questions
could be debated. With this organizational
design military coordination is organized
through different nodal points of commu-
nication which each respond to the respec-
tive needs of staff. A high level of trans-
parencty as well as trust is created. By sub-
suming operational issues to separate for-
mats (SHADE, Mercury), they are effi-
ciently depoliticized, so they can be man-
aged in a pragmatic way. Respect is paid
to different temporalities and operational
information is exchanged in real time. If
military coordination is a success story,
would a similar infrastructure be possible
in capacity building coordination? How
would a SHADE mechanism look like for
capacity building?

Without doubt, the actors that have to be
coordinated in capacity building are differ-
ent as are their tasks. Actors come from
various professional backgrounds, and
hence do not share a similar culture as the
military does. Moreover, in comparison to
naval operations, which draw on a shared
set of techniques, such as patrols, surveil-
ance, deterrence, interception or early in-
terruption, what needs to be done and
hence coordinated is much more contested
in capacity building. Yet, there are also
similarities. Part of the success story of
military coordination is, that the organiza-
tional design explicitly addresses at least
three core hindrances of coordination, that
is, trust, competition and bureaucratic poli-
tics.

Coordination requires that participating
actors trust each other and work on shared
objectives. Trust is created through every
day mutual engagement and engagement
in common projects. The importance of
trust is not only highlighted in the literature on coordination\(^9\), but also has been frequently emphasized in interviews with SHADE participants. Actors new to SHADE started in just following and observing the discussions, before they started to contribute to it. A second dimension is that actors collaborate, rather than compete (over resources, attention or political capital). In the early days of counter-piracy, military actors competed over who is to provide protection for which ships and there were a number of incidents in which navies from different countries put themselves at danger in trying to rescue the same vessel. Via the military coordination infrastructure (SHADE and Mercury) such competition has been successfully reduced.

Thirdly, effective coordination requires to by-pass bureaucratic politics. States or large international organizations face internal coordination problems, there is, for instance, often a lack of coordination between different functional agencies (e.g. criminal investigators, navies, and development agencies) or different levels (diplomacy, strategy, operations and tactics). SHADE and Mercury have successfully reduced the chance that bureaucratic politics creeps into operations, by creating a specific format for each level (WG1 for diplomacy and strategy, SHADE for strategy and tactics, Mercury for day-to-day operations).

In interviews, actors involved in capacity building coordination have frequently stressed that all three challenges (lack of trust, high level of competition, prevalence of bureaucratic politics) hamper effective coordination. This can also be observed in the hesitance of actors to use the Capacity Building Coordination Platform (CBCP) and enter data. The majority of agencies enter projects only after they are well underway, or when they are completed. Moreover, they only do so shortly before the next scheduled WG meeting, to signal their interest in coordination and as a sign of general willingness.

To draw on the lessons from military coordination for the improvement of capacity building coordination, requires the awareness that competition and bureaucratic politics have a different character in capacity building. In capacity building a range of actors, such as IMO, UNDP, UNODC are dependent on external resources provided by states. These actors de facto compete over the resources of states (which might as well decide to rather invest their money bilaterally). Also different bureaucratic logics prevails due to the different mandates of capacity building projects. If military capabilities are flexible within their mandate once employed, capacity building implies to work in more confined areas and on a specified set of project-based tasks. This places capacity-building actors in a dilemma. Before a capacity-building project has not been planned and approved by political institutions, it cannot be publicly announced, and hence not made part of international coordination (or entered into the database). If it is however approved by political levels, than it has to be implemented, irrespective of whether it makes sense in the grander strategic coordination picture.

To start coping with these coordination challenges implies, firstly, to place more emphasis on trust and confidence building. The Best Practice Tool Kit, discussed above, can be one device by which actors involved can work towards a common ground, shared projects and higher degrees of transparency. Secondly, the lessons from military coordination need to be better used for capacity building coordination. Implicitly capacity building coordination has a similar organizational design as military coordination. The three coordination bodies, the WG, the CBCG and the CBCP provide a similar infrastructure. Yet, they have to be used differently. This implies to focus in the WG meetings on larger strategic and political questions, to turn the CBCG in a technical forum of operational actors meeting quarterly that is similar to SHADE, and to revise the CBCP to become a real time communication infrastructure similar to Mercury. Creating trust, separating political and technical levels, and ensuring the confident flow of real time information will be top priorities. Moreover, the development of joint devices such as planning tools, activity maps, and lists of focal points for organizations involved in capacity building is a promising route to improve coordination.

WHAT DOES OWNERSHIP ACTUALLY MEAN?

The other buzzword that the CGPCS approach to capacity building relies on is ‘ownership’. Since the conclusion of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, ownership is an overarching principle of international assistance programs. The Paris Declaration largely defined ownership as ‘leadership’, that is, that a respective country takes leadership over the development and implementation of projects. Yet, what ownership and leadership implies in practice remains ill-defined, notably what it could imply under conditions of extreme fragility and under the absence of functioning governments.10

Ownership refers to different aspects of planning and implementing reconstruction and development projects. It refers to who sets the agenda and identifies priorities, but also who manages resources, implements and evaluates projects. If capacity building is defined in terms of empowerment than ownership is an absolute necessity. In counter-piracy capacity building, ownership has so far meant in practice, firstly, to ensure the participation of governments from the East African region in the WG and the CBCG, secondly, in the reformed CGPCS structure WGs are co-chaired by regional organizations and emphasis is placed on holding meetings in the region, thirdly, the CBCP offers the possibility of regional countries to express their needs by entering information into the database.

Ensuring participation and moving regional organizations and governments into leadership positions are important first steps towards ownership. There are, however, major tensions which hamper ownership in practice. Firstly, there is often a mismatch of the interests of the international community and the countries which are supposed to own the process. While the primary interest of the international com-

munity is in tackling piracy, for many regional countries the threat of piracy has been exaggerated and – as expressed in the regional maritime security strategies – their primary interest is in the efficient and sustainable management of the blue economy. This by nature leads to different priorities. If the international community’s priority is in policing the sea, regional states foreground measures that have long term economic benefits, including the building of better infrastructures, such as port facilities, or roads, or maritime research and education. Ownership then implies to respect these different priorities and to pay careful attention to potential clashes of interest.

International and local actors moreover tend to work within different values and often have conflicting understandings of how planning, implementation and evaluation should be carried out. International actors tend to rely on Weberian ideals and rationalist understandings of planning, in which objectives are identified and then means are devised to reach them. They draw on models and blueprints such as Project Cycle Management, or Logical Framework Analysis. In contrast, regional African countries tend to rely much more on pragmatic or even erratic ideas of planning, which from a Western perspective often appear Kafkaesque. These different understandings are major sources of tensions for ownership. This has direct consequences for the design of the core planning device – the CBCP. If using an online database that presents data in spread sheets and works with defined categories, appears a normal, common form of planning from a Western perspective, this is less so from an African perspective. In consequence, the worth of the CBCP is everything else then obvious for regional states, and governments and organizations have hesitated to use it. There seems to be little promise in pushing actors to use the database, since this is against the very idea of ownership. Rather does it imply to re-design coordination devices by ensuring that these are worthwhile and useful for the future owners in the first place.

A third tension is related to the emphasis that the CGPCS places on the expression of ‘needs’. Not only do different interests and priorities lead to the expression of different needs. To be able to identify needs, one requires knowledge (and often research) about what is actually needed. It would not be only against the principle of ownership if international actors provide this knowledge, for instance through need assessments that draw on Western standards and are carried out by international experts. It also creates the danger that regional actors produce a show for the international community in order to access resources. The only alternative is then that countries will have to learn how to conduct their own assessments in relying on experts from the region or their own countries. This in turn highlights the importance of research and education, and to work with ‘soft’ forms of capacity building, such as embedded advisors, which do not devise what a country needs, but assist in the formulation of such needs.

Ensuring participation of regional states and organizations, holding meetings in the region, and transferring leadership to regional actors are important steps to put ownership in practice. To improve ownership however implies awareness for the tensions of ownership, and to refrain from
the current ‘matching needs’ approach through an online database.

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS BETTER COORDINATION

Investing more into capacity building to tackle piracy in a sustainable manner is important now and in the future. The CGPCS is on the right way. Yet, there is much room for improving the function of the reformed CGPCS. Capacity building can directly benefit from the lessons of the CGPCS in the area of law and military coordination. This is not to say that capacity building should be treated in the same terms as the deliberation of legal challenges or as the coordination of naval forces. Yet, there are core lessons which are immediately useful.

To make capacity building a similar success story as the other fields of the CGPCS a number of steps are plausible. Capacity building could directly benefit from the following measures:

- Work towards an improved repertoire of joint planning devices, such as a Best Practice Tool Kit, real-time information exchange, or activity maps.

- De-politicize capacity building by drawing on independent experts, and by separating functional and political levels.

- Clarify the role and purpose of the different communication formats, that is, the Capacity Building Working Group, the CBCG and the CBCP.

- Place high emphasis on trust and confidence building measures as the precondition for coordination.

- Turn the CBCG into an (informal) operational forum that meets on a quarterly basis in the region.

- Re-design the CBCP to allow for the exchange of real time information and everyday mutual engagement as well as the coordination needs of the users from regional organizations and governments.

- Ensure the exchange of information at the planning stage of projects.

- Improve the levels of transparency on different governmental and organizational interests, priorities and strategies.

- Invest in research and expertise capacities in the region as a long-term form of capacity building and device for ensuring ownership.

- Rely on development and peacebuilding expertise to ensure that the mistakes of the past are not repeated.

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